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U N ITED  STATES D ISTR IC T CO URT 
EA STER N  D ISTR IC T OF N O R T H  CA RO LIN A  
SO U TH ERN  D IV ISIO N  
No. 7:10-C V -234-B R
A M IE L O Y  RY AN , )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) O R D ER
)
CO LU M B U S REG IO N A L )
H EA LTH C A R E SYSTEM , INC. )
)
D efendant. )
This m atter is before the court on the 7 O ctober 2011 m otion for sum m ary judgm ent filed 
by defendant Colum bus Regional H ealthcare System, Inc. (“Colum bus”). The period to  respond 
and reply to  the m otion has elapsed, and the m atter is now  ripe for disposition.
I. BACKGROUND
The undisputed facts in this case are as follows: P la in tiff Am ie Loy R yan (“p la in tiff’) 
w as hired by Colum bus in 2005 as a registered nurse in C olum bus’s O perating Room  
D epartm ent. (P l.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 3 ,1 D E  # 20-3.) P la in tiff w as not specifically hired to  be a 
“circulating nurse” in the operating room , but this becam e her prim ary responsibility. (P l.’s 
Dep., D E  # 20-2, at 47-49.) The circulating nurse was, in plaintiff’ s w ords, the “ overseer o f  the 
room .” (Id. at 49.) For exam ple, “ [i]f the doctors need anything” or “i f  there’s equipm ent that 
needs to  be brought in th a t’s not there,” it w as the circulating nu rse’s responsibility to  retrieve it. 
(Id.) P la in tiff w as also frequently called upon to  turn or shift a patient, w hich w ould often
1 The exhibits introduced during plaintiff’s deposition were inadvertently not consecutively numbered. For
clarity, citations to “Def. Ex.___” are to exhibits from plaintiff’s deposition, which are labeled with “Defendant’s
Exhibit” stickers.
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require lifting m ore than 100 pounds. (Id. at 60.) Som e o f  these duties are m em orialized in a 
“Physical D em ands A nalysis” required o f  O perating Room  nurses, a version o f  w hich w as 
presented to  p la in tiff during the hiring and orientation process. (Id . at 55-63 & Def. Ex. 1, D E  # 
20-3.) The “Physical D em ands A nalysis” indicates that p la in tiff w as required to  stand and w alk  
constantly as part o f  her job . (P l.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 1, D E  # 20-3, at CRHS 000007.)
P la in tiff suffered from  degenerative jo in t disease and arthritis in her knee. (P l.’s Dep., 
D E  # 20-2, at 123; A. Schuett Dep., D E  # 20-5, at 28-29.) On 10 N ovem ber 2008, p la in tiff had 
knee replacem ent surgery. (A. Schuett Dep., D E  # 20-5, at 62 & Ex. 6.) In D ecem ber 2008, 
p la in tiff w as placed on the schedule to  return to  w ork in January 2009, provided that she was 
cleared by her physician beforehand. (P l.’s Dep., D E  # 20-3, at 193-94; C. Fipps Decl., D E  # 
20-7, ^ 11.) H ow ever, plaintiff’ s leave under the Fam ily and M edical Leave A ct (“FM L A ”), 29 
U .S.C. § 2601 et seq., expired on 9 January 2009 w ithout her being cleared to  return to  work. 
(P l.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 11, D E  # 20-4, at CRHS 000030; C. F ipps Decl., D E  # 20-7, ^ 12.)
B ecause p lain tiff failed to  return to  w ork during her FM LA -protected leave, Tracie A llen 
(“A llen”), the B enefits Coordinator in C olum bus’s H um an R esources D epartm ent, sent p lain tiff 
a letter dated 20 January 2009 explaining that p la in tiff had been transferred to  a regular, i.e., 
non-FM LA  protected, tw elve-m onth m edical leave o f  absence as o f  10 January 2009. (T. A llen 
Aff., D E  # 20-8, ^ 7 & Ex. B .) P la in tiff denies having received the 20 January 2009 letter (P l’s. 
Aff., D E  # 22-1, ^  10, 12), bu t she adm its that she knew  she w ould  receive tw elve additional 
m onths o f  m edical leave w hen her FM LA  leave expired. (P l.’s Dep., D E  # 20-3, at 211.)
On or about 21 January 2009, p la in tiff subm itted a letter to  C olum bus’s H um an 
R esources D epartm ent requesting a reasonable accom m odation under the A m ericans w ith
2
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D isabilities A ct o f  1990, 42 U .S.C. § 12101 et seq. (P l.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 14, D E  # 20-4.) She 
asked that certain “adjustm ents” be m ade “to the physical dem ands o f  [her] position as a staff 
nurse” to  allow  her to  return to  work. (Id.) In particular, p lain tiff referred to  the requirem ents 
listed in the “Physical D em ands A nalysis” that she received w hen she w as hired. She requested 
“that the requirem ent to  stand be changed from  constantly to frequently” and “that the 
requirem ent to  stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl be changed from  frequently to  occasionally .” (Id.) 
P la in tiff also noted that “the healing process after a total knee replacem ent can take from  6 
m onths up to  one year for each individual to  reach 100 percent potential.” (Id.; see also P l.’s 
Dep., D E  # 20-3, at 215-18.)
In relation to  her request for accom m odation, p la in tiff also subm itted a “N otice o f 
Intent to  R eturn to W ork.” (P l.’s Initial D isclosures, Ex. E, D E  # 20-6.) She com pleted her 
portion o f  the notice and had her physician, Dr. A ndrew  Schuett, com plete the balance. (Id.) 
Effective 28 January 2009, Dr. Schuett cleared p lain tiff for “ [l]im ited duty” only, and he 
recom m ended certain restrictions. (Id.) For exam ple, p la in tiff w as not perm itted, until further 
notice, to  w alk  or to  stand for longer than tw o hours w ithout rest. (Id.) She w as also prohibited 
from  squatting, running, or crawling. (Id.; see also P l.’s Dep., D E  # 20-3, at 222-24.)
B ecause o f  the seriousness o f  some o f  the restrictions listed by Dr. Schuett, p la in tiff was 
inform ed on 26 January 2009 that M iranda K am berger (“K am berger”), C olum bus’s Em ployee 
H ealth  N urse, w ould be seeking clarification from  Dr. Schuett’s office regarding the restrictions. 
(M. K am berger Aff., D E  # 20-9, ^ 4 & Ex. A; P l.’s Dep., D E  # 20-3, at 221.) K am berger 
learned that p la in tiff could not w alk  or stand for longer than  tw o hours w ithout taking a break to 
sit dow n or elevate her legs for five to  ten m inutes. (M. K am berger Aff., D E  # 20-9, ^ 4 & Ex.
3
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A.)
On 27 January 2009, K am berger contacted p lain tiff again and told her not to  report 
for w ork the follow ing day. (Id. ^ 4.) She also told p lain tiff to  aw ait a call from  M s. G inger 
Scott (“ Scott”), C olum bus’s V ice President o f  H um an Resources, w ho w ould provide m ore 
inform ation. (Id.) On 28 January 2009, Scott called p lain tiff and told her that C olum bus could 
not accom m odate her request to  m odify the requirem ents o f  the O perating Room  nurse position 
due to  the risk to patient safety posed by her restrictions. (G. Scott Aff., D E  # 20-10, ^ 8.) 
P la in tiff w as told that her physical lim itations w ould prevent her from  being able to  respond 
prom ptly and appropriately to  patient care needs. (Id.)
A fter a few  additional m onths o f  recovery and physical therapy, p lain tiff applied for 
long-term  disability benefits in April 2009. (P l.’s Dep., D E  # 20-3, at 233; P l.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 
16, D E  # 20-4; T. A llen Aff., D E  # 20-8, ^ 8.) P la in tiff m ade the application w ith a third party, 
U num  Life Insurance Com pany (“U num ”), w hich provided long-term  disability benefits to 
C olum bus’s em ployees. (Id.)
Som etim e in late June 2009, A llen received a letter from  U num  dated 18 June 2009.
(T. A llen Aff., D E  # 20-8, ^ 9 & Ex. C.) The letter explained that U num  had approved plaintiff’ s 
request for long-term  disability benefits, w ith  her date o f  disability determ ined to  be 4 N ovem ber 
2008 and w ith benefits to  begin on 3 M ay 2009. (Id.) A s described in the Em ployee H andbook 
and in H um an R esources Policy # 4.1, Colum bus had a policy o f  rem oving from  its payroll any 
em ployee on a m edical leave o f  absence w ho becam e qualified to  receive long-term  disability 
benefits. (T. A llen Aff., D E  # 20-8, ^ 10 & Ex. D; P l.’s Dep., D E  # 20-2, at 86-87; P l.’s Dep., 
Def. Ex. 6 at 12, D E  # 20-4.) In accordance w ith that policy, A llen sent p lain tiff a letter dated 3
4
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July 2009 explaining that she w ould be rem oved from  C olum bus’s payroll effective 3 M ay 2009 
because she had qualified for long-term  disability benefits. (T. A llen Aff., D E  # 20-8, ^ 11 &
Ex. E .) Plaintiff’ s long-term  disability benefits w ere later term inated in A ugust 2009 based on a 
finding that p la in tiff w as able to  perform  the duties o f  her occupation. (P l.’s Initial D isclosures, 
Ex. G, D E  # 20-6.)
P la in tiff filed a charge o f  em ploym ent discrim ination w ith the Equal Em ploym ent 
O pportunity Com m ission (“EEO C ”) on 2 N ovem ber 2009. (P l.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 19, D E  # 20-4.) 
B ased on its investigation, the EEO C w as unable to  conclude that the inform ation obtained 
established any statutory violation. (Id., Def. Ex. 20, D E  # 20-4.)
P la in tiff subsequently filed this law suit on 17 N ovem ber 2010. On 7 O ctober 2011, 
Colum bus filed a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent (DE # 19). P la in tiff filed a response on 15 
N ovem ber 2011 (D E # 22), and Colum bus filed a reply on 29 N ovem ber 2011 (D E # 23).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sum m ary Judgm ent Standard
Sum m ary judgm ent is proper only i f  “the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to  any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to  judgm ent as a m atter o f  law .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). Sum m ary judgm ent should be granted only in those cases “in w hich it is perfectly clear 
that no genuine issue o f  m aterial fact rem ains unresolved and inquiry into the facts is 
unnecessary to  clarify the application o f  the law .” H aavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. o f  R ising Sun, 
Inc., 6 F .3d 211, 214 (4th Cir. 1993). “ [T]he substantive law  will identify w hich facts are 
m aterial. Only disputes over facts that m ight affect the outcom e o f  the suit under the governing 
law  will properly preclude the entry o f  sum m ary judgm ent.” A nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
5
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477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In considering a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the court is required to  draw  all 
reasonable inferences in favor o f  the non-m oving party and to  v iew  the facts in the light m ost 
favorable to the non-m oving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The m oving party has the 
burden to show  an absence o f  evidence to support the non-m oving party ’s case. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The party opposing sum m ary judgm ent m ust then 
dem onstrate that a triable issue o f  fact exists; she m ay not rest upon m ere allegations or denials. 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A  m ere scintilla o f  evidence supporting the case is insufficient. Id . 
at 252. “ [W ]here the record taken as a w hole could not lead a rational trier o f  fact to  find for the 
non-m oving party, disposition by sum m ary judgm ent is appropriate.” Team sters Joint Council 
No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1991).
B. A pplicability o f  the A D A  A m endm ents A ct o f  2008
P la in tiff brings her claim s pursuant to  the A m ericans w ith D isabilities A ct o f  1990 
(“A D A ”), 42 U .S.C. § 12101 etseq. In 2008, Congress m ade substantial changes to the A D A  
through the A D A  A m endm ents A ct o f  2008 (“A D A A A ”), w hich becam e effective on 1 January 
2009. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (2008). The A D A A A  w as intended to 
clarify congressional in tent w ith respect to  the original ADA, as w ell as to  overturn certain 
U nited States Suprem e Court cases that had narrow ed the A D A ’s scope. Id., § 2(b), 122 Stat. at 
3554.
Here, p la in tiff alleges that she w as denied a reasonable accom m odation from  21 January 
2009 through 3 M ay 2009 and that she w as discharged on 3 July 2009. (See, e.g. EEO C Charge, 
P l.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 19, D E  # 20-4; P l.’s Resp. D ef.’s M ot. Summ. J., D E  # 22, at 14.) Because
6
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these alleged adverse em ploym ent actions2 occurred after the effective date o f  the A D AA A, 
there is no doubt that the A D A A A  applies to  this case.
C. Failure to  A ccom m odate Claim
P la in tiff alleges that she w as discrim inated against w hen C olum bus refused her request 
for an accom m odation, w hich she subm itted to Colum bus v ia letter dated 21 January 2009.
(P l.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 14, D E  # 20-4.) P la in tiff asked that certain “adjustm ents” be m ade “to the 
physical dem ands o f  [her] position as a staff nurse” to allow  her to  return to work. (Id.) She 
specifically requested “that the requirem ent to  stand be changed from  constantly to  frequently” 
and “that the requirem ent to  stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl be changed from  frequently to 
occasionally .” (Id.)3 *7
To establish a primafacie case o f  discrim ination under the A D A  based on a failure to 
accom m odate, a p la in tiff m ust show  (1) that she w as an individual w ho had a disability w ithin 
the m eaning o f  the statute; (2) that the em ployer had notice o f  her disability; (3) that w ith 
reasonable accom m odation she could perform  the essential functions o f  the position; and (4) that 
the em ployer refused to  m ake such accom m odations. H aneke v. M id-A tlantic Capital M gm t., 
131 F. A pp’x 399, 400 (4th Cir. 2005); R hoads v. FD IC , 257 F .3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001).
2
Under the ADA, the date of the alleged adverse employment decision is the relevant date for determining 
disability. See Pollard v. High’s of Balt., Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 470 n.3 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr 
Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373, 379 (4th Cir. 2000)).
3
The court notes that there is a dispute as to whether Columbus could have accommodated plaintiff by 
placing her in another job that she could have done with her physical limitations. (Compare G. Scott Aff., DE # 20­
10, 7-8 (Scott told plaintiff there was no open position for her where she could perform the essential functions of
the job given her restrictions) with Pl.’s Aff., DE # 22-1, ^ 17 (“Ms. Scott specifically told me that there was an 
opening for a nurse in the emergency room, but she refused to let me transfer.”).) It is also not clear whether 
plaintiff actually requested a job transfer as an accommodation. However, these issues do not create a genuine 
dispute of material fact due to the court’s ultimate conclusion that plaintiff was not legally entitled to any 
accommodation under the ADA. See discussion, infra.
7
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The A D A  defines “ disability” w ith respect to  an individual as “(A) a physical or m ental 
im pairm ent that substantially lim its one or m ore m ajor life activities o f  such individual; (B) a 
record o f  such an im pairm ent; or (C) being regarded as having such an im pairm ent . . . . ” 42 
U .S.C. § 12102(1).4 In her com plaint, p la in tiff asserted tw o alternate theories o f  recovery under 
the ADA. (Com pl., D E  # 1, ^ 5.) She first alleged that she did not suffer from  an actual 
disability but that she w as regarded as disabled by Colum bus. (Id. ^  5 .a .-  5.d.) In the 
alternative, she alleged that she w as in fact disabled at the tim es relevant to  this action based on 
her inability to  run or crawl. (Id. ^  5.e.)
H ow ever, p lain tiff has subsequently adm itted that she has never suffered from  an actual 
disability and that, at m ost, she suffered from  a transitory im pairm ent in N ovem ber and 
D ecem ber o f  2008 follow ing her knee surgery. (See, e.g., P l.’s Resp. D ef.’s M ot. Summ. J., D E 
# 22, at 10 (“the p lain tiff has never asserted her actual im pairm ent”); id . at 25 (“The issue has 
alw ays been that [plaintiff] w as regarded as being disabled.”); P l.’s Aff., D E  # 22-1, ^ 10 (“I 
never took the position that I w as disabled . . . .”); P l.’s Dep., D E  # 20-2, at 120:10-11 (“I had a 
short-term  disability after I had m y knee cut in tw o and put back together.”); id . at 176:14-16 
(p lain tiff w as not disabled); P l.’s Resp. to  D ef.’s F irst Set o f  Reqs. for Adm is., D E  # 20-12, 
Reqs. Nos. 8, 13 (p lain tiff not disabled on 26 April 2009); id . Req. No. 14 (p lain tiff not disabled 
on 3 July 2009). She has also m aintained that she could have returned to  w ork in late D ecem ber 
2008. (See, e.g., P l.’s Aff., D E  # 22-1, ^ 7 (“I w as able to  return to  w ork in late D ecem ber, 2008 
. . . .”); id . ^ 9 (“ There w as little I could do . . . until I w as capable o f  returning to work, w hich 
w as in late D ecem ber, 2008).) B ecause p lain tiff alleges that she w as not discrim inated against 4
4 The ADAAA left the ADA’s three-category definition of “disability” intact.
8
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until 2009 (see, e.g., EEO C charge, P l.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 19, D E  # 20-4), she has conclusively 
established by her own adm issions that she w as not suffering from  an actual disability at the tim e 
the alleged discrim ination took place and that she is proceeding solely on a theory o f  “regarded 
as”5 liability pursuant to  42 U .S.C. § 12102(1)(C).6 *9
As previously discussed in Section II.B., supra, the A D A A A  applies to  this case. P rior to 
the enactm ent o f  the A D A A A , there w as a split am ong the circuits as to  w hether a p lain tiff could 
prevail on a failure to  accom m odate claim  i f  she could prove only that her em ployer regarded her 
as having a disability. Com pare K aplan v. City o f  N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (concluding that there is no duty to  accom m odate an individual w ho is regarded as 
having a disability); W eber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); 
W orkm an v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999) (reaching sam e conclusion 
w ithout analysis); and N ew berry v. E. Tex. State U niv., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998)
(sam e) w ith  D ’A ngelo v. C onA gra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1240 (11th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that there is a duty to  accom m odate an individual w ho is regarded as having a 
disability); K elly v. M etallics W ., Inc., 410 F .3d 670, 675-76 (10th Cir. 2005) (sam e); W illiam s 
v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police D ep ’t, 380 F.3d 751, 772-76 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); and K atz v. City
5 An individual meets the requirement of being “regarded as” disabled “if the individual establishes that he 
or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under [the ADA] because of an actual or perceived physical or 
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(3)(A).
6 Several passages in plaintiff’s response to Columbus’s motion for summary judgment provide further
support for the conclusion that plaintiff is proceeding solely on a theory of “regarded as” liability and that she has 
waived her alternate claim that she was actually disabled. (See, eg., Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., DE # 22, at 6 
(“Has the defendant regarded the plaintiff as having a disability which would, if it existed, have substantially 
impaired one or more of her major life activities?”); id. at 12 (“It is the employer in the current matter who has 
refused to let the plaintiff return to work, alleging that she is disabled.”); id. at 13 (Columbus “refused to let
[plaintiff] return to work despite her assertion that she could do the job and was ready to work because it clearly 
perceived her as having a disability . . . .”).)
9
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M etal Co., Inc., 87 F .3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (same). The Fourth  C ircuit Court o f  Appeals
court had not taken a position on this issue. See Shin v. Univ. o f  M d. M ed. Svs. Corp., 369 F. 
A pp’x 472, 480 n.15 (4th Cir. 2010); W ilson v. Phx. Specialty M fg. Co., Inc., 513 F .3d 378, 388 
(4th Cir. 2008).
H ow ever, the A D A A A  has now  clarified that an individual w ho is “regarded as” disabled 
is not entitled to  a reasonable accom m odation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h) (“A  covered entity . . . 
need not provide a reasonable accom m odation . . . to  an individual w ho m eets the definition o f 
disability in section 12102(1) o f  this title solely under subparagraph (C) o f  such section.”); 
D ennis v. Cntv. o f  Atl. Cntv., Civ. A. No. 09-6171 (NLH ) (AM D), 2012 W L 1059420, at *5 
(D.N.J. M ar. 28, 2012) (“ [T]he 2008 am endm ents to  the A D A  exem pt public em ployers from  the 
requirem ent o f  providing accom m odations for ‘regarded as’ disabilities.”); M ercer v. D rohan 
M gm t. Grp., Inc., No. 1:10CV1212, 2011 W L 5975234, at *7 (E.D. Va. N ov. 28, 2011) (“ [T]he 
2008 A m endm ents to  the A D A  form ally adopt th[e] position” that an em ployer is not obligated 
to  accom m odate an em ployee w ho is m erely regarded as disabled.); F leck v. W ILM A C Corp., 
Civ. A. No. 10-05562, 2011 W L 1899198, at *6 n.3 (E.D. Pa. M ay 19, 2011) (“N otably, the 
A D A A A  . . . dictates that a p lain tiff w ho is only perceived as disabled m ay not seek reasonable 
accom m odation.”); B lackburn v. Trs. o f  G uilford Tech. Cmty. Coll., 733 F. Supp. 2d 659, 665 
n.4 (M .D.N.C. 2010) (noting that the A D A A A , although not retroactively applicable to  the case, 
form ally adopted the position that an em ployer is under no obligation to  accom m odate an 
em ployee w ho is sim ply regarded as disabled); B atem an v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 
660, 672-73 (E.D. Va. 2009) (same). P la in tiff fails to  address this controlling law  in her b rie f 
and instead relies on pre-A D A A A  case law  to support her position that she w as legally entitled
10
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to  an accom m odation. P la in tif fs  reliance on these authorities is m isplaced, and the court finds 
that p lain tiff w as not entitled to  a reasonable accom m odation based on a perceived disability. 
Consequently, her failure to  accom m odate claim  m ust be dism issed.7 *1
D. W rongful D ischarge Claim
P la in tiff also alleges that she w as discrim inated against w hen she w as term inated from  
her position. Colum bus inform ed p lain tiff by letter dated 3 July 2009 that she w as being 
rem oved from  the payroll effective 3 M ay 2009 because she had qualified for long-term  
disability benefits. (T. A llen Aff., D E  # 20-8, ^ 11 & Ex. E .) P la in tiff does not argue that there 
is any direct evidence o f  discrim ination in this case. (See, e.g., P l.’s Resp. D e f ’s M ot. Summ. J., 
D E  # 22, at 27-28 (acknow ledging the application o f  the M cD onnell D ouglas fram ew ork to  this 
action).)
W hen only indirect or circum stantial evidence is available, a p la in tiff alleging a violation 
o f  the A D A  m ust m eet the burden-shifting fram ew ork o f  M cD onnell D ouglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). See W ilson, 513 F.3d at 387; Row e v. M arley Co., 233 F .3d 825, 829 (4th 
Cir. 2000); Ennis v. N a t’l A ss’n o f  Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995). 
U nder this fram ew ork, the p lain tiff m ust first establish a prima facie case o f  discrim ination. To 
establish a prima facie case o f  discrim inatory discharge under the AD A, a p la in tiff m ust show:
(1) that she w as an individual w ho had a disability w ithin the m eaning o f  the statute; (2) that she 
w as a qualified individual for the job  in question; and (3) that she w as discharged because o f  her 
disability. M cFarland-Peebles v. Va. D ep’t o f  M otor Vehicles, 352 F. A pp’x 848, 849 (4th Cir.
7
Because the court concludes that the ADAAA bars plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim, the court
does not consider Columbus’s alternative arguments that plaintiff failed to file a timely charge of discrimination with 
the EEOC, that she failed to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination for failure to accommodate, and that her
requested accommodations would have placed an undue hardship on Columbus.
11
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2009); EEO C v. Stow e-Pharr M ills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 2000); M artinson v.
K inney Shoe Corp.. 104 F .3d 683, 686 (4th Cir. 1997). I f  a p lain tiff establishes a prima facie 
case o f  discrim ination, the burden shifts to  the defendant “to  articulate some legitim ate, 
nondiscrim inatory reason” for the adverse em ploym ent action. M cD onnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 
802. Should the defendant carry this burden, the p lain tiff then m ust prove by a preponderance o f 
the evidence that the legitim ate reasons offered by the defendant w ere a pretext for 
discrim ination. R eeves v. Sanderson Plum bing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). The 
ultim ate burden o f  proving that “the defendant intentionally discrim inated against the p lain tiff 
rem ains at all tim es w ith the p laintiff.” St. M ary ’s H onor Ctr. v. H icks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 
(1993) (citation and internal quotation m arks omitted).
A ssum ing for the sake o f  argum ent that p la in tiff could establish a prima facie case o f 
discrim ination w ithin the M cD onnell D ouglas fram ew ork, Colum bus has produced evidence o f  a 
legitim ate, nondiscrim inatory reason for plaintiff’ s term ination. A t the tim e o f  plaintiff’ s 
discharge on 3 July 2009, Colum bus had a published policy o f  rem oving from  its payroll any 
em ployee on a m edical leave o f  absence w ho becam e qualified to  receive long-term  disability 
benefits. (T. A llen Aff., D E  # 20-8, ^ 10 & Ex. D; P l.’s Dep., D E  # 20-2, at 86-87; P l.’s Dep., 
Def. Ex. 6 at 12, D E  # 20-4.) W hen p lain tiff applied for -  and then received -  long-term  
disability benefits, she w as rem oved from  payroll pursuant to  this neutral policy. (T. A llen Aff. 
^  10-11 & Ex. E .) There w as nothing unreasonable, unlaw ful, or discrim inatory about 
C olum bus’s application o f  this neutral policy to  plaintiff. C f  K essell v. M ega L ife & H ealth  Ins. 
Co., No. Civ. A. 3:03-C V -2788-N , 2005 W L 383700, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2005) 
(em ployer’s general policy o f  term inating em ployees after eighteen m onths o f  leave w as a
12
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neutral adm inistrative policy that constituted a legitim ate, nondiscrim inatory reason for 
discharging plain tiff).8 *13
B ecause Colum bus has offered a legitim ate, nondiscrim inatory reason for plaintiff’ s 
term ination, p lain tiff m ust establish that C olum bus’s neutral application o f  its adm inistrative 
policy w as m erely a pretext for intentional discrim ination. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143; Perry v. 
C om puter Scis. Corp., 429 F. A pp’x 218, 220 (4th Cir. 2011); Row e, 233 F.3d at 829. In an 
attem pt to  establish pretext, p lain tiff points to  three Colum bus em ployees “w ho have equally (or 
m ore) disabling conditions” than p lain tiff bu t w ho w ere allow ed to  continue to  w ork  despite their 
lim itations. (P l.’s Resp. D ef.’s M ot. Summ. J., D E  # 22, at 28; see also P l.’s Aff., D E  # 22-1, ^ 
14.) It is true that a p la in tiff can present circum stantial evidence o f  intentional discrim ination by 
proving that sim ilarly situated em ployees outside o f  the protected class received system atically 
better treatm ent. See H ayw ood v. Locke, 387 F. A pp’x 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 1491 (2011); Pence v. Tenneco Auto. O perating Co., Inc., 169 F. A pp’x 808, 811 (4th 
Cir. 2006); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2005). H ow ever, p la in tiff has not 
established, or even alleged, that the three em ployees at issue w ere outside o f  plaintiff’ s 
protected class. The absence o f  any such evidence is fatal to  any inference o f  pretext. I f  
Colum bus regarded these em ployees as disabled and nevertheless treated them  differently than
8
Plaintiff attempts to create a genuine dispute of material fact by arguing that “the whole application
process [for long-term disability benefits] was insisted on by Tracie Allen on behalf of the defendant, but resisted by 
the plaintiff because it ‘feels like fraud . . . .’” (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., DE # 22, at 24; see also Pl.’s Dep., 
DE # 20-2, at 120:13-15 (in plaintiff’s mind, she never had a disability, and that is why she “felt bad” about filling
out the application for long-term disability benefits); Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s First Set of Reqs. for Admis., DE # 20-12, 
Reqs. Nos. 8, 13.) Regardless of how plaintiff felt about the application, it is undisputed that she did in fact apply 
for long-term disability benefits, that the application was subsequently granted, and that she received benefits for a 
few months. Furthermore, any conceivable force that this argument might have had is countered by the fact that 
plaintiff has admitted in her own handwritten notes that she shared her misgivings about the long-term disability
application with a Unum nurse named K. Fogg before Unum approved her request for benefits. (See Def.’s Reply 
Mot. Summ. J., Ex. L, DE # 23-3.)
13
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plaintiff, “the difference in treatm ent w ould obviously not stem from  a discrim inatory anim us 
tow ards the disabled.” Y oung v. U nited Parcel Serv., Inc., Civ. A. No. D K C 08-2586, 2011 W L 
3510997, at *3 (D. M d. Aug. 9, 2011) (em phasis in original); see also M yers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 
278, 284 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding plaintiff’ s “ sim ilarly situated” argum ent “inapposite” because 
“all em ployees to  w hom  [the plaintiff] com pares h im self are also d isabled” (em phasis in 
original)).
A lthough plaintiff’ s response to  the m otion for sum m ary judgm ent is not a m odel o f 
clarity, she also appears to  be arguing that the decision to  term inate her m ust have been 
discrim inatory because she w as in fact able to  return to  w ork in D ecem ber 2008 follow ing her 
knee replacem ent surgery. (See, e.g., P l.’s Resp. D e f ’s M ot. Summ. J., D E  # 22, at 3 (“ [T]he 
p lain tiff did not report to  w ork on January 10, 2009, although she w as capable o f  doing so.”); id. 
at 13 (Colum bus “refused to  let [plaintiff] return to  w ork  despite her assertion that she could do 
the job  and w as ready to  w ork . . . .” ); P l.’s Aff., D E  # 22-1, ^ 7 (“I w as able to  return to  w ork in 
late D ecem ber 2008 . . . .”).) H ow ever, Colum bus w as not required to let p lain tiff return to w ork 
m erely because she insists that she w as able to  do so. See Young, 2011 W L 3510997, at *3.
P la in tiff also argues that Dr. Schuett testified  in his 17 A ugust 2011 deposition that the 
lim itations he placed on p lain tiff w ould not have kept her from  doing her job . (See P l.’s Resp. 
D ef.’s M ot. Summ. J., D E  # 22, at 18.) The court does not agree w ith plaintiff’ s characterization 
o f  Dr. Schuett’s testim ony, bu t even i f  it did, it is an undisputed fact that Dr. Schuett provided 
w ritten docum entation to  C olum bus in January 2009 w hich specifically stated that p la in tiff was 
cleared for lim ited duty only and w as subject to  certain restrictions, including lim itations on her
14
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ability to w alk  and stand.9 See Pollard v. H igh ’s o f  Balt., Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 470 n.3 (4th Cir. 
2002) (“ [T]here does not appear to be any authority in the case law  interpreting the A D A  to 
allow  a m edical practitioner’s nunc pro tunc opinion to  contradict his own contem poraneous 
opinion concerning a patien t’s disability in order to  shore up a discrim ination claim .” (internal 
quotation m arks om itted)). It is also undisputed that Dr. Schuett supported plaintiff’ s application 
for long-term  disability benefits on 28 April 2009 by describing the lim itations on plaintiff’ s 
abilities as a result o f  her surgery. (P l.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 16, D E  # 20-4, at CRHS 000117-18.) 
W hen Dr. Schuett w as asked to  describe plaintiff’ s restrictions, he wrote: “ 15 m inute sit/elevate 
leg every 2 hours.” (Id. at CRHS 000118.) H e also indicated that p la in tiff could only sit for four 
hours per day, interm ittently, and stand or w alk  for tw o hours per day, interm ittently. (Id.) 
Furtherm ore, Dr. Schuett w as asked to  provide his opinion on w hen he expected an im provem ent 
in plaintiff’ s capabilities, and he answ ered “undeterm ined” in response. (Id.)
The “regarded as” provision o f  the A D A  w as m eant “to  com bat the effects o f  archaic 
attitudes, erroneous perceptions, and m yths that w ork to  the disadvantage o f  persons w ith or 
regarded as having disabilities.” B runko v. M ercy Hosp., 260 F .3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(citation and internal quotation m arks om itted). “A ccordingly, [i]f a restriction is based upon the 
recom m endations o f  physicians, then  it is no t based upon m yths or stereotypes about the 
disabled and does not establish a perception o f  disability .” K ozisek v. Cnty. o f  Seward, Neb.,
539 F.3d 930, 935 (8th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation m arks
9 Although plaintiff disputes that crawling and running were essential functions of her job (see, e.g., Pl.’s 
Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., DE # 22, at 17-18, 21; Compl., DE # 1, j j  5.c., 7), she does not appear to contest that 
constant standing and walking were essential functions of her position as listed in her job description (see Pl.’s Dep., 
DE # 20-2, at 58; Pl.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 1, DE # 20-3, at CRHS 000007) or that Dr. Schuett placed restrictions on her 
in relation to those activities (see Pl.’s Initial Disclosures, Ex. E, DE # 20-6).
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om itted); see also R uiz R ivera v. P fizer Pharm s., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 86 (1st Cir. 2008)
(“ [Plaintiff] m ay not rely exclusively on her em ployer’s recognition or im plem entation o f  the 
restrictions im posed by her own physician to  establish a regarded as claim .”); Young, 2011 W L 
3510997, at *2 (“A n em ployer is entitled to  rely on a m edical recom m endation in m aking 
em ploym ent decisions.”). Furtherm ore, “ [t]here is no case supporting the notion that an 
em ployer m ust question a m edical prov ider’s judgm ent and independently  divine w hether an 
em ployee is truly able to  w ork .” Young, 2011 W L 3510997, at *3. As a result, the court finds 
plaintiff’ s argum ents regarding the existence o f  pretext to  be w ithout merit.
It is apparent from  plaintiff’ s pleadings that her w rongful discharge claim  is really 
nothing m ore than  a poorly disguised version o f  her failure to  accom m odate claim. (See, e.g., 
P l.’s Resp. D ef.’s M ot. Summ. J., D E  # 22, at 26 (“The very discrim ination w hich the defendant 
argues the p lain tiff has not proven is proved by show ing that the defendant failed to  m ake a 
reasonable accom m odation to  an em ployee entitled to  it.”); Com pl., D E  # 1, ^ 5.c (“ [I]t w as 
determ ined, by the defendant, that the p lain tiff could not continue in her job  and she was, even in 
the face o f  her request for a reasonable accom m odation under the A m ericans W ith D isabilities 
Act, tim ely m ade, term inated from  her em ploym ent as a operating room  nurse, based on the said 
perceived disability, and for no other reason given to  the plaintiff.” ).) Here, C olum bus’s 
recognition o f  plaintiff’ s physical lim itations set forth  by her own physician and its 
unw illingness to  provide the accom m odations that p la in tiff sought, bu t to  w hich she w as not 
entitled, sim ply do not transform  its actions into “regarded as” discrim ination. See R uiz Rivera, 
521 F.3d at 86. M oreover, to  allow  plaintiff’ s w rongful discharge claim  to proceed “w ould be 
tantam ount to  allow ing her dism issed failure to  accom m odate claim  in through the back  door.”
16
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Id. The record in this case is devoid o f  evidence that the decision to  term inate p la in tiff was 
m otivated by an anim us tow ards the disabled. Therefore, plaintiff’ s w rongful discharge claim  
m ust be d ism issed.10 *17
III. CONCLUSION
The court has considered all o f  the parties’ argum ents, the record o f  this m atter, and the 
relevant legal precedent, and has concluded that there is no genuine issue o f  m aterial fact to  be 
resolved. A ccordingly, C olum bus’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent (D E # 19) is GRAN TED. 
The C lerk is directed to  enter judgm ent in favor o f  Colum bus and close the case.
This 12 April 2012.
W. Earl B ritt
Senior U.S. D istrict Judge
10 The court emphasizes that it has considered all of the arguments that plaintiff has made in an attempt to 
create a genuine dispute of material fact and has found them to be unconvincing. For example, in her response to
Columbus’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff appears to argue that she was actually fired because she 
exhausted her FMLA leave on 9 January 2009 and then requested an accommodation on 21 January 2009. (See Pl.’s 
Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., DE # 22, at 26-28.) The court finds absolutely no support for this claim in the record. 
Even if the court were to accept plaintiff’s argument that there was “obvious confusion about the date she was to 
return to work and her request for accommodation” (id. at 28), plaintiff was not discharged at the time of the 
“confusion” in January 2009 but was terminated approximately six months later, on 3 July 2009. Plaintiff 
acknowledges the 3 July 2009 termination date in her response to the motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 4, 14;
see also EEOC charge, Pl.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 19, DE # 20-4.) Thus, it is clear to the court that there is no causal 
connection between plaintiffs termination and the exhaustion of her FMLA leave or her request for an 
accommodation. The court also notes that even if plaintiff had received the full twelve weeks of FMLA leave that
she thought she was going to receive (see Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., DE # 22, at 2-3; Pl.’s Aff., DE # 22-1, ^
5) and had tried to return to work at the end of those twelve weeks on 28 January 2009, she would still have been
subject to the restrictions that had been recommended by Dr. Schuett on 22 January 2009 (see Pl.’s Initial 
Disclosures, Ex. E, DE # 20-6).
By way of another example, plaintiff argues that Columbus terminated her in order to save money. (See 
Pl.’s Dep., DE # 20-2, at 176-79; Pl.’s Aff., DE # 22-1, ^ 8.) This evidence does not support plaintiff’s claim that 
she was terminated because she was perceived to be disabled.
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